World Cup and Labor Rights in Qatar: When the Privatization of Human Rights Enforcement is not Sufficient

Raquel Regueiro Dubra

Introduction 

Since the beginning of the construction works for the 2022 World Cup, there have been recurrent allegations of serious human rights violations suffered by migrant workers involved in constructing the infrastructure needed to host the event. The need to build the eight stadiums that would host the 64 matches played during the months of November and December 2022 required the recruitment of a significant number of migrant workers. The Qatar Supreme Council for Delivery and Legacy oversaw the construction of the stadiums. Created in 2011 by the Qatari government, this Council selects national and international contractors to build each infrastructure. These low-cost workers encountered exploitative labor relations due to the ‘Kafala System,’ a control system that applies to those unskilled jobs known as "the three D jobs: dirty, dangerous and difficult" [p. 417]. 

Qatari Labor Domestic System

The Gulf States do not see themselves as countries of immigration, using instead a rhetoric of "imported labor force" [p. 2] that is composed of foreign workers on temporary contracts who will never become permanent residents in the country. Thus, the kafala system is a coercive, exploitative system that per se encourages human rights violations by governmental and non-state actors. The lack of consideration of migrant workers as potential permanent residents or future nationals reinforces the precarious living and working conditions to which they are subjected in a framework of structural discrimination.  

In Qatar, according to the now-abolished Law No. 4 of 2009, the employer (kafeel) was responsible for the safety and security of his employee, who could only obtain a visa to enter the country and be eligible to work if he was sponsored. Consequently, the legal status of these workers in Qatar including - entry, residence, transfer, and departure, depended solely on the employer, who had the legal responsibility for the employee for the duration of the employment contract. Thus, the kafeel would be the one to notify the competent authority of any change in the contract (renewal, expiration, cancellation, etc.) and the worker's domicile or civil status. The kafeel was also obliged to pay the repatriation costs of his employee at the end of the contract.

 The vulnerability of these workers is evident in multiple aspects of their employment relationship. Starting with the information they received regarding a possible recruitment in Qatar - information that comes from different sources (recruitment agencies, authorities, social networks, etc.) and that does not reflect the real conditions in which the employment relationship will develop in the country of destination. Another aspect is the payment of an initial amount to the recruitment agency that allowed them to get the job in Qatar (the recruitment process usually involves two recruitment agencies: one in origin and the other in the country of destination). That payment would become an outstanding debt. In addition, migrant workers suffer abusive conditions before, during and after their entry into Qatar. Particularly in the area of construction of the infrastructure needed to host the World Cup, migrant workers faced long working hours under extreme temperatures, low wages (or no wages at all if the employer decided to withhold large portions of wages for extraordinary charges), delays in the payment of wages, physical and psychological harm, and deplorable housing conditions, often living in “workers' camps” without basic amenities.

The kafala system was so abusive that it was impossible for a worker to leave Qatar without the authorization of his employer or, failing that, the permission of the Qatari authorities. It was also common for sponsors to confiscate workers' passports and any other travel documents as security against a possible flight risk. The combination of passport confiscation and the obligation to work only for the kafeel, in addition to the obvious restrictions to the worker's freedom of movement, limited the options in the event of a labor dispute, leaving migrants at the mercy of the sponsor's will to make any decision, including whether to leave Qatar and to return to their country of origin. Moreover, Qatar did not recognize the legal existence of a foreigner except through the mediation of the kafeel.

2022 World Cup: FIFA and ILO

Qatar's hosting of the 2022 FIFA World Cup exposed this system to an international community, that was already aware of the issue. Advocacy by non-governmental organizations and the media provided global visibility to this form of modern slavery. The world witnessed the deplorable conditions in which migrants directly involved in the construction of the infrastructure necessary for the World Cup worked and lived.

FIFA, as the owner of the event, has been under direct public scrutiny. Beyond the recurrent corruption problems it faced, FIFA was held morally responsible for the human rights abuses suffered by migrant workers in Qatar. Indeed, as the promoter and owner of the World Cup and as the entity that chooses the states in whose territories the event will take place, FIFA has the power to demand that the organizer respect human rights in the framework of the event. In the specific case of Qatar, FIFA was aware, in 2010, of the human rights situation in the country and of the existence of the kafala system. Once the FIFA-Qatar Organizing Agreement for the event was signed, it gave the organization a "pseudo-authority" [p. 12] within Qatar's national borders by requiring the State to adopt specific legislation to ensure the World Cup in Qatar would meet FIFA's standards. FIFA improved its human rights policy in the past few years, even if those changes seem to be still insufficient: FIFA accepted the ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,’ a new organ has been established - the Advisory Council on Human Rights, and the Association used its leverage on Qatar to improve the conditions of migrant workers in the various World Cup venues and the related inspection systems. From a more general perspective, the International Labor Organization, which was a great proponent of the prohibition of forced labor, launched the mechanism of technical cooperation with Qatar following the complaint made by several delegates in 2014 for the violation of Conventions No. 29 and No. 81 in order to improve the labor conditions of all migrants in Qatar - a technical cooperation that led to the legal abolition of the kafala system.

Indeed, FIFA and mostly ILO actions, albeit uncoordinated, provoked numerous legislative changes in Qatar with a view to eliminating the most harmful effects of the kafala system by achieving its formal abolition. Law No. 21 of October 27, 2015, regulating the entry, quality, and residence of migrant workers, was understood as the law that formally abolished the kafala system to replace it with an employment relationship based on an employment contract and allow workers to change employers at the end of five years of employment. The law hardens penalties for passport retention and allows workers to apply directly to the Qatari government (bypassing the employer) for authorization to leave the country. Law No. 1 of January 4, 2017, and Law No. 13 of September 4, 2018, abolished the exit permit, thus making it a worker's right to leave Qatar for vacation, in case of urgency or other reason, upon notification to the employer. For its part, the Law on the Establishment of Labor Dispute Resolution Commissions dated October 19, 2016, enhanced the protection mechanisms. Law No. 17 established a minimum wage for workers in Qatar. Law No. 18 amended certain provisions of Law No. 14 to put an end to common abusive practices such as successive probationary periods, a tightening of penalties for non-compliance with labor regulations, the employer's obligation to provide the worker with adequate housing conditions, and the establishment of a labor dispute resolution committee. Finally, Law No. 19 amended certain provisions of Law No. 21 of 2015 regarding the entry and exit of migrants by establishing the worker's right to change employment and employer.

Conclusion

 The strong entrenchment of the kafala system in Qatar, coupled with structural racial discrimination and the non-negotiable perception that a migrant will never be anything more than a worker in Qatar, never becoming a citizen, entails that the legacy of the 2022 FIFA World Cup will not go beyond a reaction to the bad press and negative publicity that could damage the event and FIFA's image. Migrants not working directly on the construction of stadiums or roads needed for the event (i.e., not under the supervision of Qatar's Supreme Council for Delivery and Legacy, itself supervised by FIFA) are left outside of a real system of protection (other construction workers, domestic workers, etc.)

It seems clear that the privatization of human rights enforcement and monitoring is effective when the non-state entity has an interest in it, without underestimating the positive effect it can have (for example, FIFA has already established a human rights policy for the upcoming World Cup in the United States, Canada, and Mexico). However, the ILO's work in Qatar will not stop after the World Cup lights have gone out at the Lusail Stadium in Doha on December 18, 2022. The employment conditions of future of migrant workers in Qatar depend to a large extent on it.

Author:

Dr. Raquel Regueiro Dubra is a lecturer in International Law at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid. She is a part of the Universidad Complutense research group ‘Globalization, Human Rights and International Law,’ and is a member of the Spanish national projects ‘Transnational organized crime, multinational companies and human rights violations’ and ‘Women's liquid rights: the CEDAW 40 years later.’ She has been published in several languages. Her publications include ‘Shared Responsibility and Human Rights Abuse: The 2022 World Cup in Qatar,’ Tilburg Law Review, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2020, pp. 27-39; ‘Targeted killings of suspected terrorists in the light of the right of self-defence,’ Revue Paix et Sécurité Internationales, No. 3, 2015, pp. 143-164.